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If everyone were perfectly agreed on ends and means, no one would ever need to change the way anyone else behaved. Hence no relations of influence or power would arise. Hence no political system would exist. Let one person frustrate another in the pursuit of his Some of these works discuss both power and conflict; however, the major thrust of the work is on either power or conflict and not the relationship between the two. 
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
To develop and test the hypotheses it is first necessary to (1) select an appropriate channel of distribution for investigation, (2) select an appropriate classificational schema of sources of power, and (3) develop an appropriate conceptualization of conflict.
The franchise channel for the distribution of automobiles was selected for study. This channel is characterized by frequent and visible conflicts [15, 16, 21, 31, 41] . In addition there is a definite balance of power in favor of the manufacturer which is in part due to the franchise contract [16, 21] . However, during the last 20 years, dealers have attempted to equalize this balance of power by lobbying and have obtained both national and state legislation [21, 24] .
During the time this study was conducted (November-December 1974), the automobile industry was in an economic depression and therefore the overall level of conflict in the channel probably was intensified. The increased conflict was due in part to the technological and production characteristics of the industry, which requires high output to attain low unit costs. Many economists suggest that production economies are not exhausted until a firm attains an output of from 600,000 to 1,000,000 units [23, chapter VI]. For the distribution of automobiles the economies of scale are even greater. Pashigian [27, p. 238] finds that per unit distribution costs are still declining as sales reach 1.8 million units. Given this incentive to produce in large quantities, manufacturers find it necessary to pressure dealers to accept more cars than they desire in slow times. Thus an inherent conflict is built into the system because the manufacturer's means of maintaining profits results in declining profits for the dealers.
Sources of Power
Of the many possible sources of power, five have been defined which seem common and important: reward, legitimate, referent, expert, and coercive [ 12] . The coercive source can be differentiated from the others because it alone involves potential punishment and therefore the individual begrudgingly yields power to another. The other four sources are noncoercive because the individual willingly yields power to another [18, 30] . Because other researchers [4, 18] have pointed out the extreme difficulty of empirically differentiating the various noncoercive sources of power and because the various power sources dichotomize meaningfully into coercive and noncoercive types, the present research involves the coercive-noncoercive classificational schema. However, by combining expert, reward, referent, and legitimate sources of power into one general noncoercive source, much useful information is lost. For example, it would be interesting to investigate the main and interaction effects of the various noncoercive sources on intrachannel conflict. The results would give strong managerial insights into the specific procedures and processes to be used in managing conflict (e.g., the use of expert versus reward power).
The criterion validity of the coercive-noncoercive sources of power was demonstrated by Hunt and Nevin [18] . They established empirically in a franchise channel of distribution that the power of the franchisor over the franchisee is dependent upon the coercive sources of power (i.e. ability to punish) and noncoercive sources of power (i.e. ability to provide high quality assistances) possessed by the franchisor. Further, they found that franchisees are less satisfied with franchisors who use coercive sources of power and more satisfied with those who use noncoercive sources. Tests of the discriminant validity of the coercive and noncoercive constructs also have been conducted [19] .
Conflict
Conflict in its most general sense can be thought of as overt behavior "arising out of a process in which one unit seeks the advancement of its own interests in its relationship with the others" (manifest conflict) [ Several analyses were conducted to test for response bias. The first consisted of comparing the respondents of the first, second, and third waves of the questionnaire2 to determine whether the later respondents (1) attributed more power to their manufacturer, (2) were less satisfied with their manufacturer, and (3) had more conflict with their manufacturer. The second analysis consisted of sampling nonrespondents by telephone and asking them to answer questions which attempted to determine whether they were similar to the respondents on these three behavioral measures. A third analysis was conducted to determine whether the responding dealers were representative of the total population of dealers in terms of the manufacturers they represented. It was concluded that the sample was representative.
MEASUREMENT
Conflict
For the purposes of this study, conflict was defined operationally as the frequency of disagreement between manufacturer and dealer, over numerous issues, as perceived by the dealer. Initially a large number of potential conflict issues were obtained by exploratory interviews with dealers and others familiar with manufacturer-dealer problems. This list was reduced to 20 issues (Table I) issues. An index of the overall level of intrachannel conflict was constructed by summing the responses on each of the 20 issues; high numbers indicated high frequency of disagreement. Therefore, the assumption is made that conflict in a channel of distribution consists of a domain of issues over which there could be disagreements between channel members. 20f the dealers responding, 60.5% responded to the first wave, 20.7% to the second wave, and 18.8% to the third wave. It should be pointed out that the measure used attempts to measure the frequency of manifest conflict; however, the scale also may be measuring some affective conflict. Dealers may have strong disagreements but never voice them to the manufacturer. 
Sources of Power
The noncoercive power of A over B is based on power that B willingly yields to A. Hunt and Nevin [18] demonstrated empirically that a possible surrogate for noncoercive sources of power in a franchise channel of distribution is the assistances that franchisors provide their franchisees. To the extent that these assistances are of a high quality, they establish the franchisor as an expert in the eyes of the franchisee; they establish the franchisor as someone with the ability to reward; they legitimize the franchisor's efforts to gain power; they help to get the franchisee to willingly yield power to the franchisor.
Measures were taken on 16 assistances that manufacturers provide their dealers. These assistances, obtained in the same way as the conflict issues, were: national advertising, local advertising, executive training, salesmen training, mechanic training, sales promotion kits, salesmen incentive programs, dealer incentive programs, bookkeeping assistance, manufacturer's service representative, manufacturer's sales representatives, tools and equipment, product warranty, inventory rebates, floor plan assistance, and service manuals. The quality of the assistances was measured on a 5-point scale: excellent quality, above average quality, average quality, below average qua-lity, and not provided. Large numbers would indicate high quality.
The coercive power of A over B is based on power that B begrudgingly yields to A because B believes that A has the ability to punish him if he does not cooperate. Automobile manufacturers possess a set of punishments they can use if dealers do not cooperate. The more likely they are perceived to be to use these punishments, the stronger will be their coercive sources of power.
Measurements were obtained on six coercive sources which were identified in the exploratory stages of the research: slow delivery of vehicles, slow payment on warranty work, unfair distribution of vehicles, turndowns on warranty work, threat of termination, and bureaucratic red tape. The perceived likelihood of a manufacturer using a coercive source if a dealer does not cooperate was measured on a 7-point scale with large numbers representing high likelihood.
Use of perceptual measures in the behavioral sciences is believed by some to be a methodological weakness. However, in studies of power, this is less likely to be the case. For example, Wolfe states that one condition necessary for O to have power over P is that P must perceive 0 as having resources [ Discriminant validity is the extent to which a concept differs from other concepts. In the study two sources of power were identified, coercive and noncoercive, which represent different constructs. Coercive sources of power involve potential punishment and therefore the franchisee begrudgingly yields power to the franchisor. In the case of noncoercive sources the franchisee willingly yields power to the franchisor.
Discriminant validity can be assessed by the use of factor analytic techniques. If coercive and noncoer- bAlthough the last factor had an eigenvalue of only .81, it was retained because it was easy to interpret and made intuitive sense. cive sources of power load on separate factors then evidence of discriminant validity is obtained.
A factor analysis was performed and six common factors were retained for interpretation ( Table 2) . Five of these factors were noncoercive and one was coercive. Overall discriminant validity was obtained because in no case did coercive and noncoercive sources load on the same factor.
RESULTS
Multiple regression was used to test the hypothesis that coercive sources of power will increase manufacturer-dealer conflict. The dependent variable was the conflict index and the independent variables were the six coercive sources. The statistical hypothesis was that the beta coefficients would be positive. The results are presented in Table 3 .
This hypothesis generally was supported because all of the significant beta coefficients were positive. This finding indicates that the dealer will engage in more conflict with the manufacturer as the manufacturer is perceived as being more likely to use coercion. Three coercive sources were important in this regard: bureaucratic red tape, unfair distribution of vehicles, and slow payment on warranty work. The multiple correlation coefficient was .460 (R2 = .211), which was significant beyond the .001 level.
The second hypothesis, that noncoercive sources of power will tend to reduce manufacturer-dealer conflict, was tested in a similar fashion. The statistical hypothesis was that the beta coefficients would be negative. The results are presented in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that this hypothesis generally was supported because all of the beta coefficients significant beyond the .05 level were negative as hypothesized. Ten beta coefficients were negative; however, only four of these were significant beyond the .05 Other potential reasons for the low R2's center around the measurement of both the dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable, conflict, has conceptually both a frequency and an intensity dimension; however, measures were obtained only for the frequency of conflict. A method for combining the frequency and intensity of conflict should result in a richer dependent variable which should lead to a higher R 2. In addition the measure for the dependent variable was perceptual rather than behavioral. Manifest conflict, by its very nature, should be measured behaviorally, not perceptually. Such a measure should increase the R2.
Finally the dichotomization of sources of power into coercive and noncoercive may result in an oversimplification of the independent variables. Although reward, expertise, legitimate, and referent sources may have something in common, they also may have unique aspects which should be measured. Obtaining separate measurements on each of the sources of power should cause the level of R2 to increase.
Although the R2's were low, it is possible to make some generalizations from the data. Of the two types of power sources investigated, the noncoercive are effective for reducing the frequency of intrachannel conflict. This finding supports propositions by Baldwin [3] and also Raven and Kruglanski [30] . To the extent that conflict is dysfunctional to the channel, the channel leader should use noncoercive rather than coercive sources. However there is disagreement as to the impact of intrachannel conflict on channel performance [35] and therefore it cannot be stated with certainty that noncoercive sources always should be preferred to coercive sources. Empirical evidence in franchise channels does support the notion that use of noncoercive sources by franchisors tends to increase the franchisee's satisfaction with the franchisor [18, 20] . Auto manufacturers need to be especially cognizant of this situation because dealers who are more satisfied with their manufacturer tend to perceive less need for legislation to regulate manufacturerdealer relations [20] .
The data also tend to support the notion that coercive sources increase rather than reduce the frequency of intrachannel conflict, and thus support propositions by Stern 
CONCLUSIONS
It can be concluded that noncoercive and coercive sources of power have significant impacts on intrachannel conflict, at least for the distribution of automobiles in the United States. Noncoercive sources tend to reduce intrachannel conflict whereas coercive sources tend to increase it. Because some conflict may be functional for channels of distribution, it was not possible to develop any conclusions as to whether coercive sources of power definitely should be excluded from use by auto manufacturers.
The study perhaps left more questions unanswered than it answered. As a result several directions for future research are available.
1. Attempts should be made to control for major extraneous variables in field studies by attempting to measure these extraneous variables directly or through some surrogates and then controlling for them in the regression equations. 2. Attempts should be made to differentiate empirically the noncoercive sources (i.e. reward, expert, referent, legitimate) so that each can be studied in more detail. 3. The interactions between the various sources of power and their impact on intrachannel conflict should be investigated. 4. The impact of sources of power on the intensity of intrachannel conflict should be investigated.
Empirical research into these areas should increase understanding of intrachannel relations and aid managerial applications.
